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Saudi Contra Funding &amp; Administration Tactics To
Continue War Against Nicaragua, May 1984-june 1985: A
Chronology
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, May 29, 1987
May 1984: As CIA funding for the contras ran out, the White House asked the Saudi Arabian
government to fill the gap. From July 1984 until February 1985, the Saudis contributed $1 million a
month to a contra bank account in the Cayman Islands. October 1984: The congressional cutoff of
all US aid to the contras went into effect. It was intended to encourage the Nicaraguan government
and the Reagan administration to negotiate. [Within six months of the US aid cutoff, the contra
forces doubled in size and their arms purchases were stepped up.] February 1985: On a state visit
to Washington, King Fahd told Reagan he would increase the donation. [The existence of the
Saudi fund was kept secret. In a February 1985 letter to contra leader Adolfo Calero, then-National
Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North said that about $20 million in funds was on its way, but
warned Calero, "Please do not in any way make anyone aware of the deposit...We need to make sure
that this new financing does not become known. The Congress must believe that there continues to
be an urgent need for funding." North also told Calero that the new Saudi money would "provide
flexibility we have not enjoyed to date." North spoke of setting up a regular resupply program that
could lead to a "steady movement of supplies and ammunition to the forward bases." He also urged
the hiring of a British friend who could carry out sabotage missions against Soviet Hind gunship
helicopters.] March 1985: $15 million of Saudi money went into the contra account controlled by
Calero. Reagan was determined to proceed with an attempt to get Congress to release $14 million
in unspent fiscal 1985 funds for the contras. North had decided such an approach would fail.
Memos and other documents have demonstrated that by the spring of 1985, North had become
a key initiator and implementer of US policy toward the contras. The documents also show him
making proposals for raising money, dealing with Congress, and shaping public opinion. At this
time, North develops a "fallback plan for the Nicaraguan resistance," contained in a top-secret
memo for then-National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane. The plan proposed using the secret
Saudi funds to continue arms purchases for the contras, while earmarking new US government
funds for nonmilitary purposes. North's plan envisioned secretly mobilizing support from Central
American presidents for the humanitarian assistance but not telling them or Congress about the
ambitious military planning for the contras that was secretly taking place. March 26, 1985: Assistant
Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "The fact that
the Nicaraguan armed resistance has been able to sustain operations reflects substantial indigenous
and hemispheric support." April 1, 1985: In an interview with The Washington Post, Reagan said,
"We're not alone helping them (the contras)," he said. "As a matter of fact, in spite of the polls,
there's more and more private support for the contras." [POST staff writers Walter Pincus and
Dan Morgan (05/26/87) mention that the notion of the contras raising their own money was often
repeated in the media in 1985. In August, for example, an unnamed administration source was
quoted in the NEW YORK TIMES as saying that since the cutoff of US aid, "They (the contras)
have learned to raise money." The article also quoted Calero as saying that "A lot of people help on
weapons...Gen. Singlaub, some Germans, some French." Last week retired army general John K.
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Singlaub testified that he served as a "lightning rod." His well-publicized fund- raising activities on
behalf of the contras effectively helped divert the attention of Congress and the media from covert
funding. Singlaub said that in two years, he raised only slightly more than $500,000 for the contras.
While Congress was being informed that the Sandinistas were engaged in a military buildup,
the Sandinistas were observing the contra buildup hidden from the Congress and the public. In
December 1984, Calero began ordering new arms and ammunition. The buying program escalated
once the big Saudi contribution was deposited. Weapons arrived by air in February and March, and
separate boatloads came in May and July.] April 4, 1985: Reagan unveiled a "peace plan" containing
key elements of the earlier North proposal. Like North's plan, it made no mention of behind the
scenes military support for the contras. Instead, it called for a 60-day cease-fire and negotiations
with the Sandinistas, as an inducement to Congress to release the $14 million in blocked funds.
Reagan agreed to use the money only for nonmilitary aid as long as the cease-fire was in effect.
House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) called the Reagan plan a "dirty trick," and a
secret plan to continue the war militarily. But O'Neill had little more than suspicions to go on, as
House Democrats were not informed either about the secret Saudi funding for the contras or the
secret White House role in directing their activities. Ten days after the contras received the secret
$15 million deposit from Saudi Arabia that the White House helped arrange, President Reagan told
reporters he thought the contras were "close to desperate straits." Congress was not aware that the
contras were increasing the size of their army, ordering new munitions and preparing for a June
offensive, result of Saudi financing. In April North outlined to McFarlane how, after the arrival of
the May shipment, "an additional 6,000 fighters can be equipped and fielded after a three-week
training period." North envisioned a total force of 30,000 to 35,000 by the end of 1985. April 18, 1985:
In his radio address, Reagan said the "peace negotiations must not become a cover for deceptions
and delay," and called on the Sandinistas not to try to gain an advantage "through a unilateral
arms buildup." April 23, 1985: The House voted by a large margin to reject Reagan's bid for the $14
million. In public, the administration voiced severe disappointment over the House vote. April 29,
1985: In a meeting with foreign journalists, Reagan said, "Whatever way they may want to frame
it, the opponents in the Congress...who have opposed our trying to continue help to those people,
they are really voting to have a totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist government here in the Americas, and
there's no way for them to disguise it. So we're not going to give up." May 31, 1985: North wrote
McFarlane that "Calero intends to launch a major offensive the day after their cease-fire/ dialogue
expires." This referred to the end of the Reagan- sponsored "peace plan" on June 1. He said in
the memo that the "political and military situation for the contras now appears better than at any
point in the last 12 months." June 12, 1985: The House reversed itself and approved $27 million in
nonmilitary aid for the contras. The administration effectively used the trip of Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega to Moscow to rally additional votes. (Basic data from WASHINGTON POST, 05/26/87)
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